The revolutionary idea that defines the boundary between modern times and the past is the mastery of risk: the notion that the future is more than a whim of the gods and that men and women are not passive before nature. Until human beings discovered a way across that boundary, the future was the mirror of the past or the murky domain of oracles and soothsayers who held a monopoly over knowledge of anticipated events.
• Information asset fragility. Companies in most industries realize that efficient operation of their complex enterprises depends on information. Every known instance of critical information corruption, damage, or destruction intensifies their concern over this dependence. Both awareness of information security and the will to address it are spreading.
• Provable security. Because no good, consistent security metrics are available, companies find themselves unable to gauge the suitability or effectiveness of different security options accurately. Consequently, the amount a company can spend on "improving" security has no natural bounds beyond its ability to pay.
• Cost justification. Economic recession and the rising cost of security solutions mean security vendors must compete with other infrastructure projects for information technology dollars. Cost-benefit analyses and returnon-investment calculations are becoming standard prerequisites for any information security sale.
• Accountability. Various industry-specific regulatory bodies, recognizing the growing exposure of their industries to information security risks, are mandating mechanisms for managing those risks. For example, the Basel II Capital Accords will soon require banks to set aside capital reserves explicitly to cover operational risks, including information security risks. Both the GrammLeach-Bliley Act (www.senate.gov/~banking/conf) and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (http://cms.hhs.gov/hipaa) compel companies in the US to be accountable for information security, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (www.sarbanes-oxley.com) includes mandatory reporting of material business changes, including serious information security incidents. Finally, when considering the tender ministrations of New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, whose apparent goal is to craft an investor-protection regime centered on the avoidance of information sharing, there's no doubt that some form of accountability is here to stay.
Early adopters are already applying risk-management tools to information security. Security measurement and quantification is a stumbling block, however. In spite of nascent efforts to perform security return-on-investment and cost-benefit analyses, reliable, statistically representative information security metrics do not exist.
If information security were a public health problem, individual companies might have some rudimentary understanding of their own information security health, but we have no aggregate basis for public policy because organizations do not share their data.
Roadblocks to data sharing
Anonymized data sharing among companies is an important tool for obtaining aggregate security metrics. In the same way that a doctor might share anonymous patient information with the US Centers for Disease Control, companies could share details of their information security experiences to help each other see the overall security picture. Several practical challenges, legal concerns, and incentive failures have stalled and continue to stall this type of data sharing.
Practical challenges range from the lack of common definitions for terms and metrics to determining how to share information meaningfully. The vocabulary of information security is fraught with imprecision and overlapping meanings. Fundamental concepts and words, such as incident, attack, threat, risk, and vulnerability, mean different things to different people. Basic metrics for counting events are difficult to collect because the terms are unclear. More complicated metrics, such as consequences of security breaches, present even greater challenges because of the time, effort, and uncertainty involved in assessing them and the inherent influence of subjective judgment. Few companies will divert scarce security resources away from security system implementations in favor of collecting and sharing security metrics. Finally, even if companies try to pool data regularly, no underlying infrastructure for compiling data for analysis exists to support them.
Policy makers in Washington, D.C., studied private industry's reservations about sharing information security data in an attempt to discover whether government could facilitate information sharing. From a legal perspective, sharing information among industry competitors could constitute collusion and therefore violate US antitrust laws. In addition, as information about security practices and incidents becomes well-known, sharing data might increase the risk of liability lawsuits. If a government agency participates in the sharing, it might be compelled to disclose data to the public under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), even if the data are proprietary and confidential.
Fortunately, policy makers have addressed many of these legal concerns, including antitrust concerns and obligations under the FOIA (though, as we write this, the situation is fluid and the preconditions for sharing still vulnerable to election-year demagoguery).
The unwillingness of many companies to share security information points to a general failing in the market- 
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Practical challenges range from the lack of common definitions for terms and metrics to determining how to share information meaningfully.
place to provide appropriate incentives. Concerns over reputation and losing customers to competitors tend to suppress many companies' inclination to report incidents, much less share information about them. Furthermore, the desire to protect confidential and proprietary information that might have been compromised reinforces the silence. Ultimately, the problem is due to lack of trust. Many companies believe that disclosing sensitive security information, even anonymously, will hurt future business. Without a structure to contradict this, their fears are as rational as the fundamental necessity of sharing.
What to measure
In settings that require balancing the cost of countermeasures against the cost of risk, decision support is precisely the point of any measurement exercise. Getting the right measurements depends on knowing the right questions. In medicine, a doctor asks, what is the patient's malady? In public health, the questions are, how many patients have this malady, and how did they get it?
In security, business leaders ask, Were we talking about some other field, we could look to prior art and industry-specific knowledge-for example, derivatives pricing in finance, health and safety in pharmaceutical manufacture, reliability in power distribution, and warehouse turns in just-in-time logistics. With security, however, we're almost starting from zero. In short, the first rule of statistics applies: Get the data; you can always throw them away later.
Data to gather

Data models to steal
In security, we are hardly inventing anything revolutionary when we support decision making under uncertainty. Whenever data are scarce, the standard approach is to build models from other fields and insert expert opinion to supplement the data. We can update and calibrate the models as new data become available, perhaps completely replacing expert opinion with objective measurements in the future. It might be an evolutionary process, but that is certainly no reason for us to start from scratch. As Picasso said, "Good artists copy. Great artists steal." So let's do some rational stealing.
Quality assurance literature. The quality control literature is vast, close in spirit to the literature the security world needs to develop, and has been quite successful over the last two decades. The mantra of the 1980s was, "Quality is free," and without a doubt, the average product quality has improved since then, as measured in any number of ways. A classic study of software quality convincingly demonstrated that developers should work on quality early in the process. 5 Table 1 shows how the cost to fix defects increases in later development stages.
We can steal much more from the quality control literature, particularly if we treat security flaws as special cases of quality flaws, assuming they are accidental and not the fruits of sabotage.
Public health terminology and reporting structure.
Public health tries to answer questions about disease inci- dence, prevalence, and spread-that is, to get the "big picture," literally. The choice of the term "virus" to describe the electronic variety was fitting and naturally suggests that we consider public health's terminology and reporting structure as models for security. Consider the epidemiologic concept of herd immunity, which means what it sounds like: for a population to survive, not every member need be immune to a pathogen. Rather, just enough of the population must be immune to prevent an epidemic. In the natural world, species and individual diversity are protective; in the electronic world, standardization on overwhelmingly dominant vendors creates a near monoculture of limited, if any, herd immunity.
Consider the Nimda worm. Even had we known the precise susceptibility characteristics for each of Nimda's transmission vectors, we would not have guessed what Nimda could do by merging several vectors into one. In this sense, diseases that mutate quickly or that affect the immune system are like Nimda. Similarly, little difference exists between an asymptomatic disease carrier (a Typhoid Mary) and a distributed-denial-of-service (DDoS) zombie waiting to be triggered. Other parallels are easy to draw.
We already have a model for measuring public health when virulence and mutation of existing disease vectors are the issue: the CDC, which is supported by American taxpayers but plays a worldwide role. Specialists from several allied institutions have called for the creation of a CDC for the Internet, with electronic analogs to the CDC's epidemiologic coverage: mandatory reporting of communicable diseases, statistical identification of excess incidence, and longitudinal trend analysis to calibrate epidemiologic models. 6 Portfolio management. Generally, portfolio management strategy aims to balance risk and reward and, when necessary, cap risk. Portfolio theory calls for managers to measure unique and systematic risk factors, calculate industry and company betas, and rigorously apply well-understood financial yardsticks. 7 Systems administrators who plan workable modes of diminished operation for computer systems are doing precisely the same thing as the portfolio managers who hedge their investment positions.
Portfolio management tries to tie reward to risk, and to do so as risk and the need for reward change. If the official measure of homeland security risk today moved from yellow to orange, what knobs would you adjust? If you answer, "We don't even have knobs to adjust," or, "All of our knobs are already turned all the way up to distort," you clearly need a better risk model, one hedged and calibrated enough to respond to external risk indicators. If you haven't calibrated the model with measurement, only one thing is certain: You will either overspend or underprotect. Recognizing this fault, analyst firms such as GIGA Group are explicitly touting portfolio management as an essential IT management skill and strategy. 8 Accelerated failure testing. Measurement drives reproducibility in manufactured goods, just as reproducibility drives productivity gains, and productivity gains create wealth. Accelerated failure testing is the calibration of manufacturing quality under the constraint of time compression.
To test a toaster, evaluators move the handle up and down 5,000 times, make toast at -40º, observe the effects of exploding bagels, and so forth. Their purpose is to give the toaster a lifetime of abuse all at once-that is, to compress time. In principle, the difference between testing a toaster and performing a serious penetration test of a Web server is very small. Thus, we might learn from the accelerated failure time testing literature.
For the toaster, we ask, "How much abuse before it breaks," not "Can we break the toaster?" In security, the measure of interest is parallel. The level-of-effort to subvert-how hard it is for the attacker to penetrate the Web server, not whether the attacker can-yields the highest return value to the upstream client. With a trustworthy answer, a rational decision maker can decide whether a plausible threat to the business exists. Without a trustworthy answer, the decision maker will fall prey to FUD. If FUD represents the dark ages, then measurement is the means to enlightenment.
Having measured the level-of-effort to subvert, however, doesn't mean we assume the device, software, or system will never fail. Rather, we can now judge whether natural product rollover intervals are sufficient or if we need to build in such strategies as mandatory upgrade, antiretention, or even automatic reinstallation. Some wellknown products already use these strategies. The Windows Media Player's end-user license agreement, for example, has had mandatory upgrade and antiretention for more than a year. Research at the University of Maryland frames the issue as determining the interval between flaw discovery and population-based patch installation. 9
Insurance. Insurance is about estimating risk better than the counterparty to the transaction and deciding whether to underwrite it or lay it off via reinsurance. In most of the world, steadily accumulating actuarial data and learning from them brings success. In the Internet business world, however, such a strategy is almost impossible.
Actuarial data require some basic stability of the underlying entity being measured. When the underlying measurement entity is subject to change, the best alternative is a moving window (left censoring) rather than a full data capture. For example, pricing life insurance based on the average life expectancy over the last thousand years would make no sense-the change in average human life expectancy has been too great.
In the electronic business world, the technical flux of change is high-so high that actuarial data are practically impossible to obtain. Add configuration complexity and http://computer.org/security/ I IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY variability to technical flux, and the chance of finding any two sites with substantially the same operating environment is almost zero. For this reason, information risk insurance generally protects against named hazards (if a specific thing happens, the insurance company will pay) rather than an umbrella (no matter what happens the insurance company will pay). Insurers must answer the same question those who worry about the critical infrastructure of any major country must answer: What is the risk aggregation inherent in the portfolio? Or, in computerese, how likely is cascade failure (a failure that spreads from one system to another in a domino effect)? All important security events, including the Nimda worm, have been cascade failures. The challenge for insurers is to insure many parties against all sorts of electronic failures without subjecting their portfolios to risk aggregation. They don't want to structure their insurance products thinking they are insuring against house fires (one event equals one claim), only to discover they are insuring against earthquakes (one event equals many claims).
Until we can measure the risk of cascade failures, measuring species (platform) diversity in the computing environment will have to substitute. The data on diversity in this environment are not good, with a handful of companies dominating every aspect of it. 10 In fact, species diversity is one of the great security tensions today. From the systems administration viewpoint, nothing is so sweet as having all platforms alike. From the security administration viewpoint, however, nothing is so frightening as having all platforms alike.
Reports to generate
If we had at least some of these data, what reports would we want to see? Some possibilities are
• Time-series trend analysis
• Self and peer trend (cross-sectional) analysis • Net present value and other financial impact analysis • Risks transferred, mitigated, and accepted
Most statisticians, epidemiologists, actuaries, and others could generate these reports. The problem is not a lack of expertise, but a lack of data. Yet, the data to gather, sift, and convert to measures do exist. They exist in virus management systems, intrusion detection logs, troubleticketing applications, configuration management platforms, security reports from third-party consultants, and so on. Those who have such data have a professional duty to reveal what those data say.
The Hoover Project: Pooled data on application security
Companies today must defend against increasingly sophisticated threats targeting specific applications. In the past year, the security community has documented an increasing number of vulnerabilities targeting business applications such as Microsoft SQL Server, Oracle, and the Internet Information Server, as well as personal productivity applications such as Outlook. John Pescatore, a Gartner Group analyst, notes that "the current generation of firewalls focuses on the network level, kind of like the walls of a fort stopping direct attack. However, close to 75 percent of today's attacks are tunneling through applications." 11 The @stake Hoover Project aimed to profile the current state of security by analyzing 45 e-business applications. We focused on applications rather than firewalls and related network infrastructure for two reasons. First, application-level attacks can easily traverse most firewalls. Second, paraphrasing infamous bank robber Willie Sutton's remark, that's where the money is. All the data presented here are real. At the same time, the data, by virtue Business-adjusted risk of being from @stake customers, are biased toward companies keenly aware of information security issues and their importance. In this respect, the insights and conclusions are not representative of any general population, but are nevertheless instructive. Other firms with data like ours need to step up now.
Cross-sectional analysis
One of @stake's primary business areas is assessing the security of client applications. Using a subset of engagement data gathered between February 2000 and July 2001, we created anonymized security profiles for 45 e-business applications (commercial packages, middleware platforms, and end-user e-commerce applications) including the potential risks they posed to our clients' businesses. To understand a typical application's security profile, we examined each assessment in our sample, classifying security defects by vulnerability type, degree of risk, and potential business impact (see the "Business-Adjusted Risk" sidebar for a description of our scoring process).
We classified the application security defects into nine high-level and 56 lower-level categories based in part on the Open Web Application Security Project's (OWASP, www.owasp.org) Application Security Attack Components taxonomy. Seventy percent of the defects were due to security design flaws, as Figure 1 shows. After excluding flaws that had low business impact or were difficult to exploit, nearly half (47 percent) of the remaining serious defects could have been caught-and fixed inexpensively-during the application design stage.
To understand what differentiates one application from another, we used outlier analysis on 23 of the assessments in our survey. For each engagement, we calculated an overall business risk index, based on the sum of the individual business-adjusted risk (BAR) scores (see the sidebar). We ranked engagements by their index scores (highest to lowest) and divided them into quartiles. Engagements with the lowest business risk index formed the first quartile; those with the highest formed the fourth.
As Figure 2 shows, the most secure applications in our analysis contained, on average, one-quarter of the defects found in the least secure. The top performers' reduced defect rates also translated into much lower risk scores. The least secure applications carried, on a business-adjusted risk basis, nearly six times more risk than the most secure, as Figure 3 illustrates. 
Time-series analysis
We used data from the cross-sectional analysis as a baseline for a time-series analysis of application security. We added application assessments from 2002-2003 to this data set and plotted trends in application security for the software and financial services industries. Because our client history is heavily biased toward these industries (perhaps indicating that they are leaders, or at least early adopters, of application security), we tracked them over time to see how the number of vulnerabilities found per application has changed over the years.
Generally, as Figure 4a shows, application security improved across all quartiles. The improvement is not uniform, however. Figure 4b shows a significant gap between the number of defects found in the first and fourth quartiles. In 2002, for example, the average number of defects found per application in the fourth quartile was 5.7 times that found in a typical first quartile application If your company is a certified leader in security, these numbers show that counterparty risk, or the risk incurred when transacting with others, is becoming a more significant part of your total risk. If your company is a security laggard, the time has come for you to take security seriously, and the numbers show it.
Return on security investment analysis
In the development process, application security is typically an afterthought, with remediation occurring only after vulnerabilities are discovered during testing or the program is released to the public. Generally accepted software engineering principles hold that software flaws are less expensive to fix early in the development process. If we could discover and fix security vulnerabilities early in the development cycle, would the downstream savings justify the costs of such preventative practices?
Using vulnerability data from our 2000-2001 application assessments and cost multiplier results from the software quality assurance literature, we calculated the return on investment of applying secure software engineering practices at different stages of the software development cycle. The return on investment was 12 percent when analysis was performed during testing, 15 percent when it was performed during implementation, and 21 percent when analysis was performed during design. 12 Although our efforts with the Hoover Project are not definitive, they illustrate the virtues of benchmarking and measurement, and offer several examples of how we can use time-series and cross-sectional analyses to find security risk factors. Imagine what would happen if industry agreed on measurement techniques, pooled data, and created a sample size several orders of magnitude larger.
The future is here
The future is already here....it's just unevenly distributed.
- and using them to generate some insight into the security problem. We can test exotic hypotheses later. Yes, the future is here, and it is unevenly distributed. As a first step to evening it out, we should agree on what we can collect now at low cost. In the electronic world, data are cheap to acquire, effortless to retain, and low-cost to aggregate and to disseminate.
A pure estimator is wonderful, not to mention necessary, in the sciences. If you want a pure estimate of a causal process, you must be wary of your measures. For example, do they have bias? Are they consistent estimators? Is your use of them free from the sorts of hidden correlations that prevent high precision and high accuracy? Are you reproducibly clear on methodological collection issues? In business, however, we don't want a pure estimator. Rather, we want a self-correcting, cost-effective control strategy.
For a control strategy, having some measurement of the underlying process is more important than having a parsimonious, unbiased, consistent, or uncorrelated and statistically independent measurement. You can even use the data you already have. When those data are spotty, as they surely are at this time, build a model of the processes you think are at work, calibrate the model with the available data, and use expert judgment for the rest. Improve the model over time, but start now.
If you already have some data, even if they are of poor quality, you can still use them for trend analysis. Even if the numbers are suspect, the trend of the data is likely accurate. Why? Because without pathological conditions, which we set aside in the name of simplicity, an estimator will have the same error in both its "before" and "after" measurements. Thus, the delta between the two will not carry the same error because the error will cancel out. Please, if you are a statistician, let this statement pass unchallenged; we have to start where people are, not where we want them to be.
And share your data. Understanding and characterizing many security issues will require data sharing. For example, unless a firm shares intrusion detection histories with its peers, it will never know whether it is a target of choice or of chance. Similarly, if the firm does not know the level-ofeffort to subvert its systems or how those systems align with those of its peers, penetration tests won't indicate whether the firm is spending the right amount of money. If you don't know how much to spend, you'll either underspend or overprotect. If your industry has no baseline and no one shares, firms are left to choose mediocrity (downside being reputation risk) or profligacy (downside being financial risk). Neither choice looks good when the baseline data become available, as they certainly will.
T he world is becoming a more dangerous place, at least for data. Even if you don't want to measure, even if you don't care whether you are overspending or underprotecting, make no mistake that it's getting harder to transfer risk contractually, so you will pay for the risk whether you measure it or not.
The quality spread between the firms providing the best security and those providing the worst is broadening, so your counterparty risk is growing even if your own risk is shrinking. Regulatory divergence between countries is also increasing, so knowing your security strengths and weaknesses has never been more critical.
If you have data and you consider yourself a security professional, then you have an ethical obligation to make something of them. Aggregate them, analyze them, share them, use them to generate hypotheses-just don't hide them.
Measurement for security is essentially inevitable and inevitably essential: the future belongs to the quants. 
